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Abstract 
In recent decades, the introduction of market principles has transformed public service delivery 
into a hybrid. However, little is known about how these changes are reflected in the attitudes of 
private implementing agents: the hybridization literature neglects individuals, and street-level 
bureaucracy research has disregarded hybridization. This paper extends Hupe and Hill’s 
accountability regimes framework to introduce the market as an additional accountability 
regime alongside state, profession, and society. Using a configurational approach, the paper 
explores how public and private food safety inspectors in Switzerland perceive the multiple 
norms for behaviour stemming from their environment. Results suggest that the plural 
accountabilities of for-profit street-level bureaucrats can increase the dilemmas involved in 
their work. Under certain circumstances, for-profit street-level bureaucrats have particular 
difficulties reconciling rule pressure with market incentives and client demands. The extended 
accountability regimes framework fruitfully captures such dilemmas and helps identify suitable 
governance responses. 
 
Keywords 
Hybridization, for-profit policy implementation, public accountability, public-private 
arrangements, street-level bureaucracy
1 
 
 
Introduction 
This paper extends Hupe and Hill’s accountability regimes framework (2007) to account for 
market mechanisms in policy implementation. Recent decades have seen the substitution of 
public ownership, planning or centralized administration for private ownership, competition 
and (quasi-)market incentives (Koppell 2010; Levi-Faur 2011). Public sector reforms like New 
Public Management (NPM), privatization, decentralization, and contracting-out have created a 
market-corporate type of bureaucracy in which governmental, non-profit and corporate actors 
cooperate in policy implementation (Considine and Lewis 1999, 2003). Hence, workers in the 
private sector now represent public policy to the people (Smith and Lipsky 2009, 13). Hybrid 
policy implementation operates at the intersection between public and private, for-profit and 
non-profit sectors: public policy goals coexist with market-led goals such as efficiency and 
profit (Deleon 1998; Verbruggen and Havinga 2017). In consequence, frontline workers (also 
called street-level bureaucrats) have to balance the rationalities and demands of the state and 
the market (Skelcher and Smith 2015). This may lead to a ‘basic tension between performance 
and representation (…) in the administrative system in many countries’ (Pierre 2009, 603). The 
marketization of policy implementation bears the ‘risk for organizations and their workforces 
of losing sight of their purpose and values in the quest for organizational survival and 
efficiency’ (Ebrahim et al. 2014: 82). 
Koppell (2010, 546) has urged Public Administration scholars to move ‘beyond the lines that 
define our field but do not reflect contemporary realities’. This implies ‘expanding our 
understanding of ‘administration’ to include market-based programs’ (ibid, 547). 
Organizational and managerial responses to multiple institutional demands in hybrid – often 
non-profit – settings are relatively well-explored (e.g., Ebrahim et al. 2014; Fossestøl et al. 
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2015; Seibel 2015). However, street-level bureaucracy research has not caught up with these 
changing faces of bureaucracy (Saetren 2014). We know that different governance models can 
demonstrably influence frontline staff’s work orientations (Considine and Lewis 1999, 2003). 
Yet how individuals at the frontline empirically experience, assess and manage competing 
demands within hybrid for-profit implementation settings is not yet fully understood (Mashaw 
2005; Pache and Santos 2010, 456).  
This paper analyses private veterinarians in Switzerland. By law, they are required to control 
livestock farmers’ compliance with food safety regulations in primary production. Livestock 
farmers pay them for these controls. Since Considine and Lewis (1999, 2003), few scholars 
have analysed private sector actors who implement public policies for profit (e.g., Considine et 
al. 2011; Dias and Maynard-Moody 2006). Little is known about whether the attitudes of these 
for-profit street-level bureaucrats differ from those of their public counterparts, and what such 
differences may imply (Buffat 2014; Oberfield 2016). Research into street-level bureaucracy 
arguably lacks an analytic instrument that systematically captures the particularities of for-
profit policy implementation. This paper provides such a tool and empirically explores whether 
and how tensions like those mentioned above materialize at the street level. 
To develop this tool, this paper combines insights on hybrid organizations with street-level 
bureaucracy research. The concept of ‘public accountability’ captures the way in which rules, 
normative and social expectations influence individual policy implementers in their social 
interactions (Pache and Santos 2010, 457). Street-level bureaucrats  
see themselves confronted with multiple demands for accountable behaviour. 
Particularly on the scale of the individual, the different values implied and action 
imperatives stemming from these varying sources may produce tensions and will 
often be contradictory, posing inescapable dilemmas for these officials (Hupe 
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and Hill 2007, 290).  
Ebrahim et al. (2014, 82) distinguish for what an organization is accountable, and to whom it is 
accountable. Along these lines, Hupe and Hill’s (2007) accountability regimes framework 
identifies three sources of accountability for street-level bureaucrats: formal rules from the state 
(here: the food safety regulations), standards from the profession (the veterinary discipline), 
and expectations from society (livestock farmers) (Hupe and Van der Krogt 2013, Hupe and 
Buffat 2014). However, research on hybrid organizations tells us that customers and 
shareholders also place demands on for-profit street-level bureaucrats. Market mechanisms 
imply a fourth type of accountability: the economic incentives stemming from the market that 
emphasize profit, competition, entrepreneurship, and efficiency in policy implementation 
(Ebrahim et al. 2014; Mashaw 2005; Seibel 2015; Skelcher and Smith 2015).   
Based on this extended accountability regimes framework, we move beyond predominantly 
conceptual, discursive or normative approaches toward accountability in order to make the 
concept measurable (see Bovens et al. 2014; Schillemans and Busuioc 2016). We address two 
empirical questions. First, how do public and private (for-profit) street-level bureaucrats 
perceive the multiple demands from their environment, and what tensions arise? Second, are 
there particular patterns? We explore three hypotheses about how the attitudes of public and 
private street-level bureaucrats might differ within the hybrid enforcement structure of the 
Swiss Ordinance on Veterinary Medicinal Products (OVMP). This case selection enables us to 
compare public and private street-level bureaucrats who implement the same policy. The fact 
that the state hardly holds them formally accountable makes them a particularly telling case for 
market-oriented accountability. Based on original survey data (Sager et al. 2012), we apply a 
configurational approach using fuzzy sets (Ragin 2000) to depict public-only, private-only, and 
mixed types of street-level attitudes.  
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We find that in terms of professionalism, the attitudes of for-profit veterinarians and 
government employed veterinarians are similar. However, they diverge in one key dimension: 
private veterinarians experience more dilemmas of policy implementation than their 
government-employed colleagues. Specifically, they are more torn by their obligations to their 
clients, policy, and market pressure. This finding suggests that government employed street-
level workers may feel a less conflicted obligation to serve the general public.  
We next elaborate the extended accountability regimes framework and specify three 
hypotheses. We then outline the empirical case, the data and methods used. Section four 
presents the empirical findings. The paper concludes by discussing the implications. 
Extending the accountability regimes framework 
According to Bovens et al. (2014, 6-7, emphasis added), 
accountability is about (…) answerability towards others with a legitimate claim 
to demand account. Accountability is then a relational concept, (…) linking 
agents and others for whom they perform tasks or who are affected by the tasks 
they perform. (…) Accountability is furthermore a retrospective – ex post – 
activity. Finally accountability is a consequential activity as anyone who is being 
held accountable may testify (…) Public accountability is accountability in, and 
about, the public domain.  
Who exercises accountability toward whom – for example, vertically between managers and 
employees, and horizontally, between peers – is an empirical question (Behn 2001). This means 
that many types of accountability are possible (Deleon 1998; Mashaw 2005).  
In the study of street-level bureaucracy, Hupe and Hill’s (2007) accountability regimes 
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framework has evolved as a central concept (e.g., Brodkin 2012; Thomann 2015; Bovens et al. 
2014; Buffat 2014; Hupe and Van der Krogt 2013; Hupe and Buffat 2014). The term ‘public 
accountability’ captures the social relationships of street-level bureaucrats in which they feel 
an obligation to explain and to justify their conduct to some significant other (Hupe and Hill 
2007, 286). ‘Accountability regimes’ are sets of guidelines for action that prevail within social 
relationships. Actors ask and give each other explanations and justifications of their actions. 
‘Action prescriptions’ are norms and demands about how street-level bureaucrats should 
preferably behave; they emerge at three levels: from institutionalized contexts; the organization 
and work circumstances; and individual characteristics. The resulting types of (subjective or 
objective) pressure add up to ‘work pressure’ at the street level. To analyse for-profit street-
level bureaucrats (Koppell 2010), we extend Hupe and Hill’s (2007) threefold accountability 
regimes framework and introduce an additional customer- and shareholder-oriented 
accountability regime with incentive pressure from the market; see Table 1.  
 
-- Insert Table 1 here – 
 
Public-administrative accountability refers to bureaucratic control or managerial approaches 
whose source is the state, that is, the law, political appointees, and administrative authorities 
(Hupe and Hill 2007, 288-289). Rule pressure means political or legal action prescriptions such 
as laws, public policies, and broader political ideologies. Implementing organizations provide 
political-administrative, organizational, and managerial imperatives, structures, and objectives 
(May and Winter 2009, 455). Street-level bureaucrats experience rule pressure, for instance, 
through recruitment processes, caseloads, performance targets, and specific tasks (Hupe and 
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Van der Krogt 2013, 62).  
As Mashaw (2005, 21) highlights, market mechanisms create particular accountabilities for 
street-level bureaucrats:  
In (…) markets, (…) producers are responsible to consumers (…) for their products’ 
quality and price. The process or mechanism of accountability is market competition 
(…). The standards are customers’ individual preferences. The effects of accountability 
to the market are, immediately, the willingness of consumers to buy the product at the 
offered price and, ultimately, a product’s capacity to maintain itself in the market. 
Following research on hybrid organizations (Ebrahim et al. 2014; Paché and Santos 2013; 
Seibel 2014), we can hence add an additional, essentially customer- and shareholder-oriented 
accountability regime that follows market principles. In the marketplace, actors adjust supply 
and demand. To survive economically in a competitive environment, for-profit service 
providers must generate profits and satisfy the customers, upon whom they depend. While 
clients are the policy’s target group, the term customer depicts an economic relationship. If the 
clients are also their customers, they directly hold for-profit street-level bureaucrats accountable 
(Mashaw 2005; Sager et al. 2014). For example, food safety auditors who are paid by their 
clients tend to reduce the rigor of audits (Lytton and McAllister 2014).  
The market emphasizes the values of maximal efficiency, profit, financial transparency, and 
growth (Tummers et al. 2012b, 2). Agencies should behave in entrepreneurial ways and pursue 
market-driven solutions. They deliver services in competition with other providers, whose basis 
is performance quality. Decentralized, supervised procedures allocate key resources according 
to output performance (Considine et al. 2011, 812, 816). Street-level bureaucrats have to 
economize their resources by maximizing output while also minimizing costs. For instance, 
clients have to be placed in jobs as quickly and cheaply as possible (Dias and Maynard-Moody 
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2006). These mechanisms result in incentive pressure. 1 
Professional accountability refers to how training and professional socialization creates 
vocational pressure (Hupe and Van der Krogt 2013, 63f). Professional peers and team members 
practise collective self-management based on their expertise (Mashaw 2005; Hupe and Hill 
2007, 290). Professional values, norms, and attitudes provide street-level bureaucrats with a 
‘set of rules one would follow if allowed to act professionally as a member of a professional 
community’ (Tummers et al. 2012b, 4) – for instance, best practice and quality standards 
(Deleon 1998).  
Finally, the shared citizenship of street-level bureaucrat and client results in participatory 
accountability (Hupe and Hill 2007, 290). The media, socio-cultural characteristics of the 
clientele, third parties and organized consumers of public services all create societal 
expectations of policy implementers (Hupe and Buffat 2014). This societal pressure translates 
into the expectations of individual clients toward frontline workers (Mashaw 2005). Street-level 
bureaucrats usually have a clear perception of their clients’ needs. They want to make a 
difference and contribute to a larger purpose (Dias and Maynard-Moody 2006, 201; Tummers 
2012, 218).  
Street-level bureaucrats are simultaneously exposed to several accountability regimes. Each of 
these regimes provides a set of norms to which they can allocate their attention and that may 
                                                 
 
 
1 Governments adopting the NPM ideology have partly integrated market-driven incentive pressure into rule 
pressure (Considine et al. 2011). This can lead to dilemmas between differing rule pressures (e.g., Dias and 
Maynard-Moody 2006). 
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then guide their behaviour (Hupe and Buffat 2014). To capture this, we define norm reference 
as the intensity with which street-level bureaucrats allocate their attention to and identify with 
particular action prescriptions. Norm reference captures subjective perceptions of actors, not 
objective behaviour.2 We observe strong reference to rule pressure when caseworkers perceive 
the policy to lead to its stated goals and agree with the policy’s goals (May and Winter 2009, 
460; Tummers 2012; Tummers et al. 2012a). For example, a veterinarian might be convinced 
that the inspections help ensure food safety. 
Multiple action prescriptions can create competing demands and values – the dilemmas that all 
street-level bureaucrats face to some degree (Lipsky 1980/2010). Dilemmas prevail when some 
action prescriptions are at the expense of or incongruent with other demands (Koppell 2005, 
99; Tummers et al 2012). The literature on hybrid organizations refers to similar phenomena as 
‘competing institutional logics’ (Ebrahim et al. 2014; Pache and Santos 2013). Our analysis 
focuses on horizontal accountability dilemmas between rule pressure and incentive, vocational 
or societal pressure, rather than on vertical dilemmas at different levels of aggregation (Hupe 
and Van der Krogt 2013). An example of a dilemma between rule and incentive pressure would 
be when a veterinarian’s inspection duties diminish profits or alienate customers (Thomann et 
al. 2016; see also Dias and Maynard-Moody 2006). Rule and vocational pressure clash when 
street-level bureaucrats perceive the demands of the policy to be incongruent with their 
professional values, norms, and attitudes (Tummers et al. 2012, 4, 5). Our food safety 
                                                 
 
 
2 Assessing the relationship between perceptions and behaviour goes beyond the scope of this study (see Tummers 
2012, 517). 
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inspectors, for example, may feel that the number and content of the inspections they should 
carry out is inadequate. Finally, the perceived lack of an added value of the policy to socially 
relevant goals or for the clients would indicate a dilemma between rule pressure and societal 
pressure (Tummers et al. 2012a, 4, 13). For example, the private veterinarians might feel that 
their controls are useless for the livestock farmers.  
Table 2 summarizes how street-level bureaucrats may refer to different norms and what 
dilemmas might arise with rule pressure. This results in seven attitudes. 
 
-- Insert Table 2 here – 
 
Hypotheses 
We explore three assumptions about how the attitudes of public and for-profit street-level 
bureaucrats might differ. A first hypothesis acknowledges that overarching sector-specific 
accountabilities, so-called “institutional logics”, guide frontline staff. This would imply a 
distinct logic of market actors (Considine and Lewis 1999; Fossestøl et al. 2015; Pache and 
Santos 2010, 2013; Skelcher and Smith 2015). We call this the sectoral hypothesis: For-profit 
street-level bureaucrats typically refer strongly to the norms of the market, while this is not 
typical for public street-level bureaucrats. Conversely, a second hypothesis captures the results 
of previous studies that observed no systematic differences between the perceived 
accountability and performance of public and for-profit street-level bureaucrats (Considine et 
al. 2011; Oberfield 2016). As professionals conducting similar work (Lipsky 1980/2010), they 
ought to share similar attitudes. Hence, according to the categorical hypothesis, norm reference 
and dilemmas do not systematically differ between public and private actors. However, third, 
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in hybrid environments, frontline workers have ‘to be accountable to a multiplicity of actors, 
expectations, and in varying conditions’ (Buffat 2014, 84; see also Busuioc and Lodge, 2016). 
Facing many different and sometimes contradictory accountabilities, their attempts at being 
accountable in multiple senses increase the potential for competing demands (Deleon 1998; 
Koppell 2005). We call this the private dilemma hypothesis: For-profit street-level bureaucrats 
typically experience multiple dilemmas simultaneously, while this is not as salient with public 
or mixed (i.e., shared by public and private veterinarians) street-level attitudes. 
Data and methods 
Data 
We explore these hypotheses in the context of the decentralized hybrid implementation 
structure of the OVMP. This policy regulates veterinary drugs for livestock to ensure animal 
health and food safety (Sager et al. 2012). Its main target groups are the private veterinarians 
who dispense the drugs, and the livestock farmers who administer the drugs to the animals. To 
enforce the OVMP, public inspectors of 23 regional (cantonal) veterinary offices, named public 
veterinarians, carry out official on-site inspections every five years in veterinarians’ practices, 
and (until 2012) every ten years on livestock farms. Additionally, the private veterinarians 
monitor the livestock farmers themselves. Written agreements between veterinarians and 
livestock owners entail biannual visits to the farms. During these visits, the veterinarians are 
legally obliged to check the farmers’ compliance with the OVMP. Furthermore, a private 
veterinarian must supervise each on-site fabrication of medicated feedstuffs (OFM).  
-- Insert Table 3 here -- 
While their jobs are not identical, public and private veterinarians share important analytic 
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features that make them comparable, see Table 3. According to Lipsky (1980/2010, xi), street-
level bureaucrats are professionals who implement a public policy, interact directly with clients, 
and enjoy high discretion and relative autonomy from organizational authority. Regulatory 
processes entail a) agenda-setting and decision-making, b) adoption and implementation, c) 
monitoring compliance, d) enforcement and e) evaluation and review (Verbruggen and Havinga 
2017). As implementing agents, both public and private veterinarians are primarily active in 
phase c, while also having some tasks in phase d. They oversee compliance of farmers with the 
same official regulations, although with differing frequencies. Their control tasks overlap: they 
check the health status of livestock as well as the facilities and documentation concerning the 
supply, use, and storage of drugs. This always entails a physical inspection of the production 
sites together with the farmer in order to detect or prevent violations of the regulations. Public 
veterinarians can sanction livestock farmers through fines and other administrative measures, 
while private veterinarians are legally obliged to refrain from prescribing and selling veterinary 
drugs such as antibiotics, or even report to authorities if livestock farmers do not comply with 
the regulations. 
Next to direct interaction with livestock farmers as clients when visiting farms, public and 
private veterinarians also share their professional background as trained veterinarians. All 
public veterinarians have previously worked as private veterinarians. They know each other 
and attend professional events together. Finally, both public and private veterinarians do not 
operate within a strong organizational environment, and they typically have no line managers 
above them. Federal oversight is very weak for public veterinarians and absent from private 
veterinarians (Sager et al. 2014, 487). The federal administration does not gather data about the 
inspection activities of neither public nor private veterinarians. Hence, failure to carry out their 
duties has no consequences. Public veterinarians do not monitor the private veterinarians’ 
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activities as implementing agents either. This creates similarly high levels of autonomy. 
As Verbruggen and Havinga (2017) highlight, hybridization implies that actors with diverging 
rationalities are involved in regulation – here, public and for-profit implementers. Second, the 
same actors can simultaneously have several regulatory roles. Indeed, private veterinarians are 
simultaneously implementers and target group of the policy. Third, hybridization often entails 
self-regulatory and multi-level elements. In our case, the state delegates monitoring activities 
to the private sector, and the decentralized federal setting impedes effective monitoring and 
enforcement on the implementing agents.  
As a result, public and private veterinarians face different incentive structures. Public 
veterinarians are employed by the state, while private veterinarians are self-employed. This 
arrangement has a strong for-profit element: The private veterinarians charge the farmers for 
their enforcement activities and depend economically upon them. The public and private street-
level bureaucrats also differ in terms of when and how they interact with the clients. The private 
veterinarians check farmers much more regularly. Besides their control function, the private 
veterinarians are primarily (for-profit) service deliverers. Furthermore, they have a mutually 
interdependent power relationship with the clients. Therefore, private veterinarians might refer 
more strongly to societal pressure than public veterinarians. They are likely to be prone to the 
customer-driven type of accountability. Conversely, the public inspectors have an asymmetric 
power relationship with the farmers. They interact with each individual farmer only once a 
decade. Some cantonal inspectors also deliver (non-profit) information and counselling 
services, but only to a limited extent. Generally, their reference to participatory and market 
accountability should be weaker. 
In summary, both public and private veterinarians have identical professional backgrounds, 
implement the same overarching policy, interact with the same target group, and enjoy great 
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autonomy (Sager et al. 2014, 487). These commonalities (marked bold in Table 3) enable us to 
compare their attitudes toward the diverse action prescriptions of this policy. Additionally, the 
hybrid structure of the OVMP creates differences in the work contexts, incentive structures and 
accountabilities of public and for-profit policy implementers. We will now analyse the 
consequences of these differences.  
Data was gathered during the formative evaluation of the OVMP in 2012. We conducted semi-
structured telephone surveys with cantonal public veterinarians (N = 21). The cantons of Ticino 
and Zug did not participate in the interviews, but Liechtenstein is subject to the OVMP. An 
online questionnaire containing both open and closed questions (published in Sager et al. 2012) 
was sent to all registered Swiss private veterinarians (response rate of 25 per cent, N = 371). 
After excluding 78 cases with missing values and private configurations with low empirical 
relevance (see below), the sample comprises 18 public and 269 private veterinarians. Rather 
than being a result of selection bias, their unequal proportions represent the implementation 
setting at hand. 
Methodology 
A street-level bureaucrat experiences and responds to multiple simultaneous action 
prescriptions. Set-theoretical configurational analysis (Ragin 2000) captures that street-level 
bureaucrats display a combination of attitudes, rather than focusing on single accountabilities. 
We analyse the prevalence of those attitudes listed in Table 2, where norm reference can be 
strong or weak, and dilemmas can be present or absent. Given that there are seven attitudes in 
Table 2, we can build a ‘truth table’ with 27 = 128 possible configurations of street-level 
attitudes, not all of which are found empirically.  
The rationale of the analysis is straightforward. To assess our hypotheses, we provide a 
simplified description of those configurations of attitudes that were observed among public 
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veterinarians only, among private veterinarians only, or that are shared by public and private 
veterinarians (mixed attitudes). Rather than merely listing all observed configurations, we 
additionally reduce these configurations to their parsimonious core. For example, if we have a 
combination A and B and C and another combination A and B and c (lowercase notation means 
“the absence of C”) which are both shared only by private veterinarians, then it is irrelevant 
whether C is present or absent. We can simply say that private veterinarians share the 
combination A and B (regardless of whether C is present or absent). An automated procedure 
called ‘logical minimization’ eliminates irrelevant attitudes, using the software fs/QCA 2.5. 
This is a very straightforward procedure that relies on basic set theory: A*B is the same as 
A*B*C + A*B*c, where * indicates the Boolean AND and + indicates the Boolean OR. For in-
depth explanations of this method, see Fiss (2011), Ragin (2000) and Schneider and Wagemann 
(2012). 
Obviously, street-level bureaucrats refer to attitudes to different degrees. Fuzzy set scores, 
ranging from 0 to 1, indicate whether the attitude (the ‘set’) is present or absent, and to what 
degree. In a process termed ‘calibration’, measurement values are attributed to fuzzy set scores 
based on substantive and theoretical knowledge. The ‘crossover point’ of 0.5 is crucial: it 
establishes the qualitative difference in kind between set membership or non-membership.3 For 
example, for the set ‘dilemma between rule pressure and professional norms’, our respondents 
could rate the usefulness of the biannual visits on a Likert scale from 1 (very useful) to 4 
(useless), and the crossover point was set at 2.5. If a veterinarian rates the biannual visits as 
                                                 
 
 
3 Each case displays each configuration to a degree but has membership above 0.5 in only one of them. 
15 
 
 
rather useless (3), she experiences a dilemma (fuzzy value of 0.7). However, her dilemma is 
less pronounced than that of another veterinarian who rated the visits with 4 (useless; fuzzy 
score of 1, see Table 4 below). If a veterinarian rated the visits as rather or very useful, she did 
not experience a dilemma – again, to differing degrees. 
We used three simple measures to deal with the analytic implications of the skewed data 
structure (Schneider and Wagemann 2012, 244-249). First, we analyse a large set of private 
veterinarians. In large-N analyses, measurement error could be an issue: hence, we should not 
afford attitudes shared by only very few private veterinarians the same importance as those 
shared by many private veterinarians (Maggetti and Levi-Faur 2013). We therefore exclude 
from the analysis purely private configurations displayed by only one or two private 
veterinarians (a so-called frequency threshold; see Fiss 2011, 403, 407). Conversely, with the 
small set of public veterinarians, a frequency threshold would cause us to lose important 
empirical information. As Figure 1 below shows, only two configurations feature more than 
two public veterinarians. It is not recommended to use a frequency threshold with such low 
case numbers (Maggetti and Levi-Faur 2013). Second, two parameters of fit called consistency 
and coverage often serve to evaluate the results of explanatory configurational set-theoretic 
analyses. However, the unequal case distributions distort these indicators.4 Fortunately, there is 
no need to base our descriptive analysis on them: we can detect private-only, public-only and 
                                                 
 
 
4 The consistency measure, ranging from 0 to 1, expresses the degree to which the statement ‘membership in X ≤ 
membership in Y’ holds for all cases (Schneider and Wagemann 2012, 127-128). Consistency is artificially low 
for the public only configurations, where Y is skewed toward 0, and generally high for the private only 
configurations. The exact opposite holds for the coverage scores. 
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mixed attitudes simply by looking at case numbers. Applying these two strategies to remedy 
skewness, we define public-only configurations as those with N (private) = 0, private only 
configurations as those with N (public) = 0 and N (private) ≥ 3, and mixed types as 
configurations with N (private) ≥ 1 and N (public) ≥ 1.  
Additionally, third, we tested how robust the results are in response to these strategies 
(Schneider and Wagemann 2012, 244-249) (Figures A1 and A2, appendix). When analysing 
the private-only attitudes without a frequency threshold, logical minimization yields several 
equally plausible results, which renders them hardly interpretable (Baumgartner and Thiem 
2015). This test confirms that it is useful to apply a frequency threshold. An analysis of mixed 
attitudes applying a frequency threshold for private veterinarians robustly supports all our 
substantive conclusions (Maggetti and Levi-Faur 2013). 
 
Measurement and calibration 
Table 4 summarizes the measurement and calibration of the attitudes, including the detailed 
survey questions and answer categories. The raw data will be posted at 
http://www.compasss.org/bibdata.htm. Whenever available, we chose identical survey 
questions for public and private veterinarians. Some other items measured the same attitude 
considering the specific circumstances facing public or private veterinarians. We combine such 
functionally equivalent items with the logical OR. This minimizes the impact of missing values 
on the sample (Schneider and Wagemann 2012, 45-47). Most survey items used a four-value 
Likert scale. Here we applied the so-called direct calibration method, using a logistic function 
to fit the raw data between the three fuzzy set anchors at 1 (full membership), 0.5 (crossover 
point), and 0 (full non-membership). As explained earlier, the crossover point at 2.5 indicates 
the qualitative difference between the first two and the last two answer categories (e.g., [rather] 
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disagree versus [rather] agree).  Those items in Table 4 without a crossover point were 
calibrated as dichotomous ‘crisp’ sets (Schneider and Wagemann 2012, 35-38). 
 
-- Insert Table 4 here -- 
Results 
We now discuss what types of attitudes and peculiar patterns we observed. 
 
Types of attitudes 
Figure 1 displays the 42 of the 128 possible configurations of street-level attitudes that we 
observed empirically.5 Values of 1 for an attitude indicate fuzzy set scores above 0.5, values of 
0 indicate fuzzy set scores below 0.5. Three features stand out. First, the vast majority of both 
public and private veterinarians refer strongly to professional values. This reflects their shared 
professional background and general preferences for autonomy (Lipsky 1980/2010). In other 
words, virtually all street-level bureaucrats see themselves as professionals; a basic – in this 
sense, trivial – feature. Second, the public-only configurations (rows shaded white in Figure 1) 
represent only three public veterinarians. Essentially, we cannot identify empirically relevant 
‘public only’ types of street-level attitudes because there are not enough public veterinarians. 
                                                 
 
 
5 Rather than being attributable to a small N, this amount of limited empirical diversity (67 per cent) indicates that 
our data are clustered. 
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The subsequent analysis therefore focuses on private only and mixed attitudes. Third, 16 private 
only configurations do not pass the frequency threshold (grey font colour in Figure 1). This 
produces a dropout of 24 private veterinarians (8.2 per cent). 
 
-- Insert Figure 1 here – 
 
 
Salient patterns 
Logical minimization then reveals six mixed (Figure 2) and seven private-only (Figure 3) types 
of street-level attitudes. In these figures, black dots indicate that an attitude is present, and white 
dots indicate that it is absent. Blank spaces mean that an attitude is irrelevant. For example, the 
first row of Figure 2 shows the following type of mixed attitude: strong reference to rule 
(STATE), incentive (MARK), vocational (PROF) and societal (SOC) pressure and the absence 
of a dilemma between state and the market accountability (dmark). Dilemmas between rule and 
vocational pressure (DPROF) or societal pressure (DSOC) are irrelevant. The first column tells 
us that 47 street-level bureaucrats display this configuration of attitudes. Rather than discussing 
each type in depth, we simplify our discussion of the results and focus only on those attitudes 
shared by more than 90 per cent of the cases. Vertical boxes highlight these dominant common 
patterns.6 We illustrate these patterns using interview excerpts translated from German. 
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Figure 2 illustrates the attitudes that public and private veterinarians have in common. 
Dilemmas are relatively rare. However, all mixed attitudes combine a strong reference to 
professional values with strong reference to either market norms or societal pressure. The 
suggestions of a public veterinarian on how to improve the OVMP illustrate this constellation: 
[MARK] A model that allows the veterinarians to sell drugs to livestock owners for on-
farm storage, coupled with continuous education, is more efficient than increased 
documentation and checks (…) [PROF] it takes too long until medical products 
authorized in the European Union are available in Switzerland (…) It is good that import 
authorizations are possible; this should be eased (…) The different risks posed by 
premises of different sizes and with different species should be considered more (…) 
[SOC] We shouldn’t regulate even more. It is too much of a police-patrol law. 
 
-- Insert Figure 2 here -- 
 
Going back to the case numbers in Figure 1, we see that these mixed attitudes cover the majority 
of the public veterinarians, but only 19 per cent of the private veterinarians.  Accordingly, 
Figure 3 reveals a strong cluster of uniquely private street-level attitudes.7 Contrary to our 
                                                 
 
 
with the other attitudes displayed in Figures 2 and 3. They are part of the identified types of veterinarians’ attitudes 
in the vast majority of the cases, but do not represent types of street-level attitudes on their own (Schneider and 
Wagemann 2012, 281). 
7 The question arises whether these clusters are only an artefact of the skewed data structure, which implies a much 
higher probability for private veterinarians to display an attitude than for public veterinarians. We argue that this 
is not the case. Let us go back to Figure 1 and assume that private veterinarians are equally likely to have a mixed 
20 
 
 
sectoral hypothesis and despite an empirical tendency, strong reference to the market norms is 
not a dominant attitude that is only typical of for-profit street-level bureaucrats. By contrast, all 
these private-only street-level attitudes combine a strong reference to professional values with 
either a clash between rule pressure and societal pressure, or a tension between rule pressure 
and incentive pressure. These dilemmas of private veterinarians reflect their conflicting roles 
within the implementation arrangement of the OVMP, where they are simultaneously 
implementing agents, target group, and professionals.  
 
-- Insert Figure 3 here -- 
 
Private veterinarians perceive the policy to be incompatible not only with the demands of their 
clients but also with their own needs as clients of the policy. As expected, the frequency and 
quality of their interaction with the farmers seems to strengthen participatory accountability. 
The succinct answer of a private veterinarian to the question which negative consequences the 
OVMP had, expresses this tension: 
 
                                                 
 
 
attitude (the 9 rows shaded grey) or a private attitude (the 14 rows shaded dark that pass the frequency threshold). 
This would be the case if there really were no systematic difference between public and private attitudes. Based 
on the configurations observed in Figure 1, we compared the expected distribution of private veterinarians in 
private-only and mixed configurations with the empirically observed distribution using a simple Chi-square 
statistic. If private veterinarians were distributed in a proportion of 9 (mixed) to 14 (private only), this would result 
in a frequency of 61 per cent of all private veterinarians displaying a private-only type. Instead, we observe 81 per 
cent. This difference is statistically significant, χ2(1, N = 269) = 26.32, p < .001. If there were no systematic 
difference between public and private street-level attitudes, then more private veterinarians than observed would 
share their attitudes with public veterinarians. 
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[DSOC] A veterinarian needs drugs to work. No animal gets better by filling in papers. 
 
The results also illustrate a widespread tension between the expectations of the clients as 
customers and the rules of the policy (DMARK). Sager et al. (2014, 17, 19-20) have described 
this tension as follows:  
Some livestock owners exert significant pressure on veterinarians to stretch the 
regulations to their own favour (…) the easiest way for veterinarians to avoid a loss of 
customers is if they can bypass unfavourable provisions without this being discovered. 
An effective enforcement of the OVMP’s regulations is a potential threat to the 
veterinarians’ business. (…) This creates a dilemma where economic interests often 
impede the effective enforcement of the OVMP. 
As rule pressure and incentive pressure prove incompatible, the private veterinarians are torn 
between the state and the market. Sager et al. (2014) describe how the role of market actor 
overrules that of implementing agent. The opposite is also possible, if the policy causes negative 
financial consequences for the for-profit street-level bureaucrats. The words of a young 
veterinarian, describing the consequences of the OVMP for his professional routine may best 
illustrate this dilemma: 
 
[DMARK] I have one hour of additional work per day, without any added value for my 
practice. How am I supposed to start a business like this?  
 
We now discuss the implications of these findings for our hypotheses. 
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Discussion 
The introduction of market principles into policy implementation in face created a ‘tension 
between performance and representation’ (Pierre 2009, 603) in the attitudes of the street-level 
bureaucrats we studied here.  
Our findings do not support the sectoral hypothesis: strong reference to market norms is not 
typical of for-profit street-level bureaucrats only. Rather, both state and market actors can refer 
to market incentives. They vary greatly in how they practise accountabilities and experience 
dilemmas. However, we also found systematic differences between public and private 
veterinarians (categorical hypothesis refuted). In support of the private dilemma hypothesis, we 
find that the vast majority of private veterinarians do not share their attitudes with public 
veterinarians. Under certain circumstances, for-profit street-level bureaucrats typically find it 
particularly difficult to reconcile the rules of the state with the incentives of the market and/or 
the needs of their clients. The institutionally complex, hybrid implementation arrangement of 
the OVMP and its incentive structure create conflicting accountabilities for private 
veterinarians. Simultaneously, and although street-level bureaucrats often face conflicting 
demands, these problems affect the public veterinarians less.   
We illustrated our theoretical argument with a skewed set of street-level bureaucrats that were 
particularly likely to be held accountable by the market and their clients. The effects of 
regulatory delegation are heavily context-dependent (Overman 2016). Regulatory contexts 
comparable to ours have a strong multi-level structure with low levels of oversight of street-
level bureaucrats. They involve an economic dependence between the implementing agent and 
addressees (e.g., food safety audits in the United States).Other populations or different policy 
areas might see different responses to hybridization (e.g., Fossestøl et al. 2015). Rather than 
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providing a statistically representative theory test, our analysis has generated some new insights 
with interesting implications.  
Conclusion 
Research consistently shows that the delegation of regulatory tasks to market actors fails to 
deliver the expected results (Overman 2016). Indeed, market elements in policy implementation 
can worsen output performance instead of improving it (Dias and Maynard-Moody 2006; 
Thomann et al. 2016). By linking the hybridity literature with accountability concepts and 
moving beyond case studies to analyse a unique large set of for-profit street-level bureaucrats, 
our study sheds light on the still poorly understood mechanisms that underlie such findings. We 
find that the institutional complexity of hybrid arrangements ‘is making matters increasingly 
complex for practitioners – especially with regard to the proliferation of expectations made of 
them’ (Buffat 2014, 71). The many accountabilities of for-profit policy implementers can 
further increase the inherent dilemmas of street-level work (Fossestøl et al. 2015; Koppell 
2005).  
This analysis has focused on frontline attitudes. We lack data on the performance of individual 
for-profit implementers to directly link these attitudes with behaviour. How the observed clash 
of accountabilities affects performance remains an empirical question for future research. Yet 
Sager et al. (2014) have shown that about fifty per cent of the private veterinarians substantially 
neglect their implementation duties. The empirical link between these accountability dilemmas 
and the actual performance of for-profit street-level bureaucrats requires systematic attention. 
Many argue that attempts to do equal justice to contradictory accountabilities are likely to fail, 
which renders compliance impossible (Koppell 2005; Pache and Santos 2010). These 
conflicting accountabilities might therefore lead for-profit policy implementers to favour 
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economic performance over central policy goals like equality, fairness and inclusion – 
especially when effective oversight is absent (Considine and Lewis 1999, 471; Ebrahim et al. 
2014; Lytton and McAllister 2014; Pache and Santos 2010). This is a result not of lacking 
accountability in the for-profit sector, but of ‘too much’ accountability (Koppell 2005).  
Our analysis has several governance implications. Arrangements in which implementing agents 
economically depend upon the target group they control, without adequate monitoring, are not 
promising. Rather than assuming a priori benefits of marketization, policymakers and 
practitioners should consider and address possible mismatches when assigning implementation 
duties to for-profit agents (Overman 2016). As Deleon (1998, 554) highlights, ‘the challenge 
for government is to identify the varying task environments in each sphere of action and use 
mechanisms of accountability that are appropriate in this area’ (see also Mashaw 2005, 15, 24). 
The extended accountability regimes framework is a useful analytic tool for both experts and 
practitioners to anticipate accountabilities and possible dilemmas of street-level bureaucrats. 
The framework applies insights from hybridization research to individual implementing agents 
(Pache and Santos 2010, 2013; Skelcher and Smith 2015), operationalizes the accountability 
concept empirically (Behn 2011; Bovens et al. 2014; Busuioc and Lodge 2016; Mashaw 2005), 
and accounts for the introduction of market elements into street-level bureaucracy (Koppell 
2010). 
Hybridization research tells us that actors in hybrid arrangements demonstrably develop 
strategies and practices that integrate different logics over time (Skelcher and Smith 2015; 
Fossestøl et al. 2015). These responses vary, depending on the nature of demands and the degree 
to which an organization represents conflicting demands (Pache and Santos 2010). They range 
from decoupling (prioritizing one logic over another) through compromise (altering demands 
to restore balance) to the coupling of competing demands by reconciling their intact elements 
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(Pache and Santos 2013). Applied to the Swiss case, it could become economically viable for 
private veterinarians to perform their control duties adequately.     
Practical proposals to address accountability dilemmas often focus on organizations as a whole 
(Pache and Santos 2010) or on ‘managerial dilemmas’ (Seibel 2015), rather than on individual 
service deliverers. Ebrahim et al. (2014) discuss how several governance tools may prevent 
‘mission drift’: monitoring of social and commercial activities or manager performance (e.g., 
quality controls), and opportunities for representation and participation of beneficiaries. 
However, the decentralized governance structure studied here impedes effective monitoring, 
and lacks the organizational embedding necessary to implement such measures. Lytton and 
McAllister (2014) highlight the usefulness of buyer vigilance; for example, consumers in the 
United Kingdom can opt for brands that ensure rigorous on-farm controls. Other mechanisms 
to change accountability structures include tort litigation, liability insurance, accreditation, 
benchmarking, media coverage and network configurations.  
The results presented here highlight that such responses could differ even within organizations 
and below managerial levels. Notably, private street-level bureaucrats, too, display the 
strikingly high levels of observable professionalism that are at the heart of street-level 
bureaucracy (Brodkin 2012; Hupe and van der Krogt 2013; Lipsky’s 1980/2010). Capitalizing 
on these strong professional norms and values, mechanisms of self-regulation could countervail 
dilemmas (Lytton and McAllister 2014; Pache and Santos 2013). For example, the 
institutionalization of professional networks could enable opportunities of exchange that are 
likely to influence the individual coping decisions. Professional organizations could apply 
‘naming and shaming’ strategies to foster good control practices. Following this, the extended 
accountability regimes framework fruitfully applies established concepts of street-level 
bureaucracy to the study of hybrid, for-profit policy implementation. Moreover, it paves the 
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way for a better understanding of the potential benefits and pitfalls of such arrangements. 
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Tables and Figures 
TABLE 1 Extended accountability regimes framework 
Key source State Market Profession Society 
Accountability Political-
administrative 
Customer- and 
shareholder-
oriented 
Vocational Participatory 
 
Formal rules  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
------------------------- 
Rule pressure 
Cost minimization 
Benefit 
maximization 
Customer 
satisfaction 
Shareholder value 
creation 
Competition 
 
------------------------- 
Incentive pressure  
Professional values, 
norms, and attitudes  
Good practice  
Peer review 
 
 
 
 
 
------------------------- 
Vocational pressure  
Societal 
expectations 
Perceived clients’ 
needs  
 
 
 
 
 
------------------------ 
Societal pressure 
Author’s own elaboration, based on Mashaw (2005), Dias and Maynard-Moody (2006), Hupe and Hill (2007), 
Considine et al. (2011), Hupe and Van der Krogt (2013), Hupe and Buffat (2014). 
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TABLE 2 A typology of street-level attitudes 
Source State Market Profession Society 
Norm 
reference 
1. Reference to rule 
pressure, e.g., 
 rules, tasks or 
targets 
 
 standard 
operating 
procedures or 
contract 
 
Examples: 
Powerlessness 
Personal 
meaninglessness 
Policy perception and 
endorsement 
2. Reference to 
incentive pressure, 
e.g., 
 goals of 
efficiency, 
financial 
transparency and/ 
or profit  
 customers’ 
demands 
 goals of output 
maximization / 
expenditure 
minimization 
 
3. Reference to 
vocational pressure, 
e.g.,  
 internalized 
professional 
standards 
 professional 
values 
4. Reference to 
societal pressure, e.g., 
 shared goals and 
standard setting 
 clientele and 
societal goals 
Dilemmas 
with rule 
pressure 
-- 7. Competing 
demands from rule 
pressure and incentive 
pressure  
 
Examples: 
Financial loss due to 
policy 
Alienation of 
customers / 
shareholders due to 
output tasks 
Incentive pressure has 
negative impact on 
output delivery 
6. Competing 
demands from rule 
pressure and 
vocational pressure 
 
Examples: 
Policy-professional 
role conflict 
Organizational-
professional role 
conflicts 
5. Competing 
demands from rule 
pressure and societal 
pressure 
 
Examples: 
Policy-client role 
conflict 
Client 
meaninglessness 
Societal 
meaninglessness 
Own illustration, based on Mashaw (2005), Dias and Maynard-Moody (2006), May and Winter (2009), 
Considine et al. (2011), Tummers (2012), Tummers et al. (2012a, b), Hupe and Buffat (2014). 
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TABLE 3 Public and private veterinarians compared 
  Public veterinarians Private veterinarians 
Control activities Private veterinarians: Every 5 years 
Livestock farmers: Every 10 years 
Livestock farmers: 
Biannual visits 
Every fabrication of MFS 
Content  Checking health status of livestock, 
facilities & documentation  
Supply, use, and storage of drugs 
Checking health status of livestock, 
facilities & documentation  
Supply, use, and storage of drugs 
Oversee OFM 
Enforcement tools Sanctions, fines, administrative 
measures 
Supply with drugs, notification 
Service delivery Medium to low (advice, information) High (advice, diagnosis, prescribing 
& selling drugs) 
Professional 
background 
Trained veterinarians Trained veterinarians 
Interaction with 
clients 
Medium; direct 
Asymmetric power relation 
High; direct 
Mutual interdependence (economic 
dependence vs. availability of drugs) 
In
ce
n
ti
ve
 
st
ru
ct
u
re
 
Job context  Source of income: state 
Low organizational embedding 
No line managers 
No federal monitoring & oversight 
No cantonal monitoring 
Source of income: clients 
Low organizational embedding 
No line managers 
No federal monitoring & oversight 
No cantonal monitoring of control 
tasks 
Boldface indicates commonalities between public and private veterinarians 
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TABLE 4 Measurement and calibration 
 Set Operationalization  
Calibration anchors 
Fully in 
(1) 
Neither 
in nor 
out (0.5) 
Fully 
out (0) 
STATE1: Overall, do you find the documentation provisions of the 
OVMP suitable to achieve the policy’s goals?1 
1 2.5 4 
STATE2: Overall, do you find the control system of the OVMP 
suitable to achieve the policy’s goals?1 
1 2.5 4 
MARK1: How would you rate the usefulness of the written 
agreement (TAM-Vereinbarung) that enables private veterinarians to 
dispense veterinary drugs to livestock farmers for on-farm storage?2 
1 2.5 4 
MARK2: How much effort would it be for you to store the 
documents for 5 (instead of 3) years?6 
1 2.5 4 
DMARK1: As how wide-spread would you rate the use of veterinary 
drugs by private veterinarians that is not in accordance with the 
provisions of the OVMP?7 
2,3,4 -- 1 
DMARK2: What financial consequences did the OVMP have for 
you?8 
2 -- 1, 3 
PROF1: Are you in favour of the possibility for private veterinarians 
to import veterinary drugs for stockpiling?1 
1 2.5 4 
PROF2: Should the inspections be planned in a more risk-based 
manner in your view?1 
1 2.5 4 
DPROF1: Do you think the number of inspections that must be 
carried out is adequate?1 
4 2.5 1 
DPROF2: Do you find the content of the inspections as required by 
the OVMP to be practicable and does it make sense?1 
4 2.5 1 
DPROF3: How would you rate the usefulness of the required 
biannual visits by private veterinarians to livestock farms if a written 
agreement exists?2 
4 2.5 1 
DPROF4: Do you have the knowledge necessary to assume the task 
as an FTVP?1 
4 2.5 1 
SOC1: In your opinion, are the regulations of the OVMP too 
restrictive for certain sectors?3 
1 -- 2 
SOC2: How would you rate a possible sharpening of the 
documentation provisions?4 
4 2.5 1 
DSOC1: In your view, do the withdrawal periods set out by the 
OVMP ensure the safety of the food products of animal origin?1 
4 2.5 1 
DSOC2: Has the OVMP contributed to an improvement or a decrease 
in the availability of veterinary drugs on the market?5 
3 -- 1, 2 
 
Item for public veterinarians Item for public & private veterinarians Item for private veterinarians 
Answer categories: 
11= yes, 2 = rather yes, 3 = rather not, 4 = no  
21 = very useful, 2 = rather useful, 3 = rather useless, 4 = useless 
31 = yes, 2 = no 
41 = very positive, 2 = rather positive, 3 = rather negative, 4 = very negative 
51 = improvement, 2 = neither nor, 3 = decline  
61 = very high, 2 = rather high, 3 = rather low, 4 = very low  
71 = 0-25%, 2 = 25-50%, 3 = 50-75% , 4 = 75-100% 
81 = my costs have been reduced, 2 = my costs increased, 3 = my costs have not changed 
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FIGURE 1 Types of street-level attitudes 
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FIGURE 2 Mixed types of street-level attitudes 
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FIGURE 3 Private only types of street-level attitudes 
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Appendix  
FIGURE A1 Mixed attitudes with frequency threshold for private veterinarians 
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FIGURE A2 Private only attitudes without frequency threshold for private veterinarians 
 
 
